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ESTIMATING PRIVATE DEMANDS 
FOR PUBLIC GOODS: A SURVEY 
Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro 
ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this paper is to present a methodology for the empirical study of 
individual preferences for public goods. We survey the literature annotating the main critiques 
to the now seminal paper of Bergstrom and Goodman(1973) and present some suggestions 
on the direction of future research. 
AEA Code: 010 Key words: Demands for public goods; median voter 
RESUMO 
Este artigo propõe uma metodologia para estudos empíricos das preferências 
individuais para bens públicos. Através de uma revisão crítica da literatura, tomando como 
base o seminal artigo de Bergstrom e Goodman (1973), apontamos os componentes mínimo 
para estudos empíricos nessa área, 
Cód. AEA 010 Palavras-chave demanda por bens públicos; eleitor mediano 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to built sound policy, the public official must recognize the 
preferences of individuals. In the case of private goods, one need to obtain 
output, prices and income observations and estimate a utility maximization 
consistent demand function. On the other hand, for the case of public 
goods, one needs to use a more sophisticated mechanism of preference 
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revelation than prices. This is the most important message of Samuelson 
(1954). 
For the case of public goods, the political system plays a key role in 
determining the aggregation of individual preferences. There are two 
approaches to the output decisions in democracies with majority voting. 
First, given the result that if preferences are single peaked over a sigle-
dimensional issue, the voter who demands the median quantity of public 
good cannot lose, then the only relevant public good preferences are those 
of the median voter. This is the famous Median Voter Theorem.^ Second, if 
public officials have some degree of agenda control (or any assumption of 
the median voter theorem does not hold), then there is some other 
mechanism for preference aggregation at work. The extreme example 
would be the budget-maximizing bureaucrat model of Niskanen (1971), 
while other possibilities may be an income aggregated mechanism i.e., 
politicians have better ears' for the preferences of rich individuals or an 
aggregation based on demographic characteristics. 
The seminal paper on the empirical study of individual preferences for 
public goods is the work of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), BG hereafter. 
There they study expenditure decisions of 826 municipalities, located in US 
states, using the median voter framework. In this paper, we shall review the 
authors' work, using it as a base to present guidelines to future studies, 
drawing on later works that criticize BG and recent theoretical 
developments. 
2. THE BERGSTOM AND GOODMAN METHODOLOGY 
In this section we shall review BG's methodology, listing the 
assumptions used and then criticizing each, so to build a methodology. 
Let there bej= ^,...,Jmunicipalities, where / = 1 c o n s u m e r s live. Let 
Xi be the a Hicksian rx)mposite numeraire private good and Z * the actual 
quantity available of public good to the individual /. Let n be the number of 
individuals in a community. The relationship between the amount of public 
good actually perceived by the agent and the output provided by the 
government, Z, is determined by Z * = z (n, Z). Thus, the individual BG 
assumptions are: 
1. Public Goods are measured in such a way that each municipality j 
supplies Z at constant unit cost QJ. 
^ See Mueller, 1989 for a complete exposition of the Median Voter Theorem. 
^ Some of the criticisms listed here have been pointed out by Romer and Rosenthal (1979), 
RR hereafter, and Tod6-Rovira (1987) among others 
2. Each consumer pays a fraction r, of the total cost; further, tj does 
not varies with Z. 
3. Consumers have perfect information on its tax price TI qf, this is the 
price' of the public good. 
4. The quantity supplied is the median quantity demanded. 
5. The median quantity demanded is demanded by the median 
individual dual income. Further, the median income agent lives in the 
median value property and the property is its only property holding. 
6. The quantity demanded is a monotonic function of income, across all 
j and on the whole range of V,, income. 
7. Individuals perceive Z* = Z of the public good (congestion 
function specification). 
8. Prices of private and public goods are the same across / 
9. Individuals believe that new taxes will not be disproportionally 
assigned to firms. Further, the taxes paid by commercial and 
industrial property is borne by individuals living outside j; or their 
number is very small. 
Further, BG assume that the elasticity of substitution between public 
and private goods is zero. Stiglitz (1974) has shown that if there are private 
substitutes, single peakedness is destroyed, as RR note. In terms of the 
estimation, the omission of a non-zero elasticity of substitution will lead to 
bias in the estimates. 
Let us now comment on the above assumptions. As we shall see, most 
are compromises so to avoid too complicated estimation orto meet the 
availability of data. Unfortunately these compromises may be harmful. 
Assumption 1 is necessary in order to abstract the supply side on the 
provision of public goods. The assumption leads to a horizontal supply of 
public goods. In addition, by assuming a constant unit cost the "tax price" is 
an exogenous variable and no bias in generated by estimating a demand 
function only. Implicitly, as BG state in their footnote 2, they assume that 
municipalities have (identical) homothetical production functions and face 
horizontal input supply curves. The 'identical' is necessary when prices 
change across / It seems that assumption 1 was necessary so that one 
could avoid dealing with the production side of public goods. 
While assuming that the consumer i's tax share does not change with 
the size of municipal expenditures is not significant, given that any change 
in constant costs are taken up by q^, the authors forget that the tax share 
does depend upon n, the number of individuals in the community. To see 
why, note that the tax share is such that, within a community, public goods 
production costs are covered: 
ir,qiZ = qZ 
i=i 
Thus if / increases, it must be the case that at least one of the tax 
shares X j decreases. This will be relevant, if we are to assume mobility of 
agents.^ 
While the third assumption is standard of demand studies under 
certainty, BG provide a theorem (in their appendix) that shows that under 
certain conditions, the errors in perception of the tax price are insignificant 
to the estimation process. Of course the violation of this assumption will 
bias estimates, but this is a problem of demand estimation, not of their 
methodology. 
The fourth assumption is the Median Voter Theorem, MVT hereafter. 
Obviously this assumption will hold only if the Theorem holds. This is a 
significant weakness of their methodology. Their model cannot test the M V I 
against competing models of individual preferences aggregation, it just 
takes it as a working assumption. But the MVT will fail if: 
1. Individuals do not have single peaked preferences over a one 
dimensional issue and/or there is a multidimensional issue. 
2. There is incomplete turn-over (Munley, 1984). 
3. Individuals cannot vote on the whole range of output level.^ 
4. There is some agenda control from the part of the bureaucrats or 
legislative. 
5. Expenditure decisions are not made via referenda (see RR). 
6. There are substitutes for public goods (Stiglitz, 1974). 
We see there is an important institutional framework needed so that the 
MVT may be at work. GB do not present any information on whether the 
above conditions are met. In fact, RR indicate that 'most of the municipal 
expenditure decisions analyzed by GB* are ia fact made by representative 
legislatures'(p.159). Further, Munley (1984) developing a methodology by 
Holocombe(1980), shows that the reversion level, when a referendum 
proposal is defeated, and the number of referenda are significant to 
determine whether the expenditure level is the median one. Finally, Romer 
et al. (1993) show that the existence of matching grants are significant on 
determining the median desired amount of public good. 
' And of course the possibility of some kind of Tiebout equilibrium Allowing for the Tieboirt 
hypothesis will destroy the assumption of proportionality of income distributions across 
communities We shall return to this below 
" See Mueller (1989), for the conditions on multidimensional issues 
^ In other words, there is only a limited number of referenda and/or agents can only vote yes 
or no for a given quantity See RR 
Assumptions 1-4 determines that the community is in Bowen 
Equilibrium. This means that the amount of Public Good provided is 
efficient; the public good supply is Pareto Optimal. Unfortunately, as 
Bergstrom (1979) shows, the Bowen Equilibrium will hold if and only if the 
mean of the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between the public and 
private composite good is equal to these rate, or in the following cases: 
1. The distribution of the MRS among individuals given the amount of 
public goods and the tax rate is symmetric. 
2. There is transferable utility. 
3. Agents have different (identical) preferences on a log-linear utility 
function and identical (different) wea!th(s). 
4. Proportional wealth tax and log linear utility functions. 
5. Or the income distribution is proportional in the BG sense. 
These are indeed quite restrictive assumptions. In fact, Goldstein and 
Pauly (1981) show that if some kind of Tiebout mechanism is at work, then 
the income distribution across communities will not be proportional. The 
main implication of the failure of the Bowen Equilibrium hypothesis is that 
each municipality observations will not be as an observation on the demand 
curve for the median voter. 
But probably the main weakness of the BG methodology is the 
identification of the median voter, assumption 5. Even if the MVT holds the 
median voter will be the one that has median income if and only if there are 
differences in tastes but income distributions are proportional across 
communities (BG's theorem 1) or if in each municipality individuals have 
monotonic demands when income changes everywhere over the range of 
public good output, assumption 6. This implies that agents have constant 
price (tax) and income elasticities. Todó-Rovira (1987) is keen to show that 
this is an unduly restrictive assumption and that it has significant 
consequences for the parameter estimation. RR criticize this assumption on 
the combined effects of income and family size, the latter not even 
considered by BG. 
Todó-Rovira (1987, 1991) extend the BG model so that the median 
voter theorem is tested. While he claims that his methodology tests whether 
the MVT holds, it tests whether the median-voter is the one that has the 
median income or is in a different fractile of the income distribution, i.e., the 
aggregation process is income weighted. His methodology is relevant to 
avoid the fractile fallacy, in the sense of RR.® 
The fractile fallacy means that the model cannot distinguish whether the 
® While in his theoretical presentation he entertains the idea that the median voter is ttie one 
with mean income or a function of the taxes paid, his empirical model is able to test only the 
income-weighted aggregation assumption 
mean income or median or any otiier fractile of income is pivotal to 
determine the amount of public goods demanded. The regression model 
only indicates that there is a significant correlation between output and the 
median characteristics of the municipality. Whether this median 
characteristics are in fact those of the voter that demands the median 
output, it cannot be verified. 
The second part of assumption 5 is needed so that the authors can 
asses the tax share of the median income individual, that is assumed to be 
the median voter. One sees that the constant income and price elasticities 
are a compromise in order to make the estimation and data requirement 
problems manageable. While this may be a compelling reason for such 
assumptions, it menaces the generality of conclusions and risk the accuracy 
of the estimated parameters. Another of such 'convenience' assumptions is 
assumption 9. If that was not the case, then the true tax price will depend 
upon the incidence of taxes and in the case the median voter owns 
commercial or industrial property his/hers tax share will be underestimated. 
Assumption 7 deals with the congestion (or crowding) properties of the 
public good. The rationale behind this assumption is that the publicly 
provided good may not be a pure public good. Thus, as more individuals 
share the good, more of this good should be produced so to keep the level 
perceived by each agent constant. In the case of the functional form chosen 
by BG, RR notes that the range of the crowding parameter is 0 < y < 1, 
determining a pure public and a pure private good, respectively. BG do not 
determine the upper bound. If the parameter is greater than one then one is 
faced with the idea that the amount of the good perceived by each agent is 
less than the amount in the case the good were a private one. This 
uncomfortable result leads RR to conclude that, due to misspecification of 
the demand function, the parameter is picking up both economics of 
consumption and diseconomies in production as population size increases. 
Recall that the model assumes that the public good is produced at constant 
costs, so if diseconomies in production are present, they will bias the the 
crowding parameter. 
Regardless of the above criticisms, Edwards (1990) develops a flexible 
functional form so to allow for both decreasing (BG model) and increasing 
marginal congestion and variable congestion rates across the population 
range. His conclusions, based on a model that follows BG very closely, but 
with a different data set, are that while the constant crowding assumption is 
not warranted, there is evidence of diminishing mar'ginal congestion. Thus 
one should use his flexible form specification of the congestion function in 
future empirical studies, even though his conclusions suffer from the same 
problems as BG does. 
Finally, assumption 8 is quite important. The first implication is that 
different public/private good ratios across communities will render the 
dependent variable as a biased measure of output. Second, and more 
important is that, if one follows BG's footnote 7, it is clear that the estimation 
was constrained under the assumption that the price elasticity e was equal to 
unity, so that the estimation is invariant to different price ratios across 
communities. And most of the estimated elasticity's are indeed close to one. 
The seriousness of the constant price ratio is recognized in Bergstrom et al 
(1982). It seems that in the latter work the data on prices was available to 
the authors. 
Before we draw the conclusions of this survey, summarizing the 
guidelines for future empirical studies of the demand for public goods, I will 
comment on two other works, not summarized in RR. Bergstrom et al (1982) 
suggest the use of micro-data, from surveys, to study the demand for public 
goods, given the superior fit of such data when compared to aggregate data. 
This also circumvents the assumption that the median voter is the one with 
the median income. In fact it allows for the test of this assumption. 
The second study, by Murdoch et al (1991) claims to test the MVT 
against an oligarchy choice model of public good output determination. The 
testing variable is whether the amount of military expenditures in NATO 
countries is a function of the median income of that country (so the MVT 
hplds) or whether is not a function of income (so the oligarchy model holds). 
If both hypothesis are rejected "some unspecified model like voter pressure 
gioup" holds (p.628). Again, the study fall into the fractile fallacy. Second, 
there is no guidance if whether individuals in the NATO countries actually 
vote on military expenditures by referenda, or the expenditure decision is a 
part of the total budget for the fiscal year. In the latter case, it is quité 
unlikely that voters have single-peaked preferences. And in the former, 
representative voting produces significant noise, as RR indicate. Not 
surprisingly, the conclusions are not strong for any of the hypothesis 
considered. 
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this paper we have critically assessed empirical studies of individual 
demands for public goods. We used as base for our study the now 
'canonical' [Romer et al (ibid)] model of Bergtrom and Goodman (1973), 
which is based on the median voter theorem and the assumption that the 
median voter is the one that has the median income. The suggestions for 
empirical studies are clear. 
First and foremost the researcher should identify the institutional setting 
where expenditure decisions take place. The voting procedure, the 
reversion level, the opportunity for agenda control by bureaucrats, the 
presence of matching grants, are among the variables that determine the 
institutional framework. Second, micro-data should be preferred with respect 
to aggregate data.'^ Third, the assumption of constant unit costs should be 
avoided. It has been suggested that the crowding parameter of the demand 
function may be significantly biased because of such assumption. Of course 
this implies that data on the production of public goods must be available. 
Fourth, one should use a flexible congestion function specification, following 
Edwards (1991). Fifth, the demand function should be flexible enough so to 
allow for non-zero elasticity of substitution between private and public goods 
and non-constant income and price elasticities. Last, one should make the 
assumption that the median voter has the median income a working 
assumption, following Todó-Rovira (1987). 
In terms of theoretical models one should consider strategic behavior 
by both suppliers and demanders of public goods. Holocombe (1980) is a 
good example of such conflict. It would be interesting also to fit a model 
where the supply side is determined by a Niskanen-type bureaucrat® and 
the demand side is based on some (unknown) aggregation of individual 
preferences. Imperfect information on both sides® may also be important in 
determining the functional form on empirical studies of public goods 
preferences.'" 
We realize that the above suggestions impose high costs in terms of 
required data. But we claim, based on different literature results, that any 
compromise on the above suggestions may generate significant bias in the 
estimates, endangering the conclusions obtained. 
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